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       When does international trade hurt workers?  The classic answer provided by 
Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson (1941) presumed a Heckscher-Ohlin scenario in 
which only two commodities are produced with two productive factors completely 
mobile between sectors.  The factor-intensity ranking of traded commodities told all, with 
real wages in the country importing the labor-intensive commodity unambiguously 
worsened if it should lower protective barriers to trade, while real wages in the exporting 
country would rise.
1  This answer has proved popular not only because it is simple, but it 
also has minimal data requirements (Edward Leamer, 1998).  However, there is another 
simple model that emphasizes the distinction between factors that are specific to 
individual sectors and a more mobile factor like labor (Ronald Jones, 1971 and 
Samuelson, 1971), a model that provides a richer set of criteria by which to judge the 
effect of trade on wage rates.   
      Specific factors are a pervasive phenomenon in production processes.  Not 
only is capital specific in the short run in the form of equipment designed for particular 
products
2, there are many products for which factor specificity is a good first 
approximation.  For example, oil fields, rice paddies, and coffee plantations may be 
                                                           
1 This remark assumes that the same commodity is labor intensive in both importing and exporting 
countries.  In the many-commodity case other outcomes are possible (Ronald Jones (2002). 
  2converted to other uses only when the prices of those products fall to very low levels
3.  
Any degree of heterogeneity in land, capital, or labor yields to those factors economic 
rents in particular industries and thus lends the flavor of factor specificity to a broad 
range of factors.
4  Common labor is perhaps the least specific of all factors, and so it 
seems appropriate to apply the specific-factors model to the impact of trade on a 
significant fraction of a nation’s workers.
5  
        In this specific factors model labor’s nominal wage will be raised by an increase in 
either commodity price, but proportionally not by as much.  Since the cost of living to 
workers would also increase, there emerges a neoclassical ambiguity about the effect of 
commodity price changes on the real wage rate.  It was in this setting that twenty-five 
years ago Ruffin and Jones (1977) argued that there is a presumption that labor stands to 
gain in real terms by more open trade regardless of the trade pattern.  However, a recent 
paper by James Melvin and Robert Waschik (2001) supplies a valuable computer-
generated example in the specific-factors context that suggests that when elasticities of 
substitution in production are sufficiently low, mobile labor’s real wage is depressed by 
any movement away from autarky.
6  The effect of trade on real wages is obviously an 
important issue, and it is imperative that within the model characteristics of technology 
that can resolve the apparent conflict be laid bare even though many features of markets 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 See Wolfgang Mayer (1974), Michael Mussa (1974) and J. Peter Neary (1978) for an analysis of short-run 
specificity of capital. 
3Gottfried Haberler (1936, p. 194) points out the long-run factor specificity mainly in extractive industries. 
4 See Roy Ruffin (2001) for an analysis of quasi-specificity in a model with features both of the Heckscher-
Ohlin and the specific-factors model. 
5 Both Ruffin (1981) and Jones and Stephen Easton (1983) show that the mobile factor in the specific-
factors model may share many of the properties of a “middle” factor in the general three-factor, two-
commodity model. 
6 Of course it has often been suggested that low elasticities of substitution in production may be detrimental 
to labor (for a survey see William Tyler, 1974), primarily if there is a promotion of capital-intensive 
import-competing activity.  Note that in the Stolper-Samuelson model such elasticities do not count – only 
factor intensities matter. 
  3and economies outside the scope of the competitive specific-factors model also may be of 
relevance.   
        We present a framework for analyzing the specific factors model that pinpoints 
the characteristics that cause workers to gain or lose with trade.  In addition to changes in 
the cost of living, the special relationship that turns out to be important is the function 
relating the price elasticity of the nominal wage rate to further changes in relative 
commodity prices (we call this the Beta function).  Although our analysis is conducted 
for two sectors, it generalizes in simple fashion for any number of sectors.  This research 
is important because it suggests some promising the empirical studies as well as policies 
that might be followed to ameliorate any losses workers might sustain from trade.   
Section 1 reviews the foundations for studying the price elasticity of the wage 
rate.   Section 2 introduces a new way to describe the specific factors model.  We show 
that the gains to labor can be broken down into potentially measurable “terms of trade” 
and “production bias” effects.  Section 3 analyzes in detail how, with constant elasticities 
of substitution, changes in prices or factor endowments affect wage gains when 
commodity prices change, and Section 4 concentrates on scenarios in which trade is 
damaging to workers. Section 5 allows world prices to be determined endogenously and 
shows that a result reminiscent of the Heckscher-Ohlin model extends to the specific 
factors model: If trade is caused by labor being the abundant factor, then labor will gain 
from trade.  But if trade is caused by other factors, such as technology differences, trade 
can prove hazardous for labor.  Section 6 summarizes the paper and makes some 
concluding remarks on future research. 
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1.  Labor Intensity and Technological Flexibility with Specific Factors           
           A deeper study of the specific-factors model can benefit from a reprise of what is 
already known (Jones, 1971; Mussa, 1974).  Let commodities be labeled 1 and 2, and 
factors by L for mobile labor, K1 and K2 the factors specific to each sector, aij the input-
output coefficients, w and rj the nominal wage and rent in the j
th sector, and pj the j
th 
commodity price.  The requirement that labor be fully employed is shown in equation (1):  
(1)          aL1x1 + aL2x2 = L  
Techniques are sufficiently flexible so that specific capitals are also fully employed: 
(2)          aKjxj = Kj       
Each input-output coefficient depends upon the ratio of the wage rate to the return to the 
type of specific factor used in that sector.  Indeed, the definition of the elasticity of 
substitution in a sector is provided by (3), where a “hat” over a variable indicates the 
relative change in that variable: 













In the competitive profit relations, costs for each xj are driven down to price: 
(4)          aLjw + aKjrj = pj     
The input-output coefficients along the unit isoquant are selected so as to minimize unit 
costs of production at given factor prices, requiring: 
(5)         ˆˆ 0, Lj Lj Kj Kj aa θ θ +=  
with the θij denoting factor i’s distributive share in industry j.  Differentiating the 
competitive profit conditions, (4), and making use of (5): 
  5(6)          ˆˆ Lj Kj j j wr ˆ p θ θ +=      
Finally, the relative change in each input-output coefficient can be obtained by 
combining equation (5) with the definition of the elasticity of substitution in each sector 
given by equation (3): 
(7)          a ˆˆ ( Lj Kj j j w ˆ ) ; r θ σ =− −            ˆˆ () ˆ KjL j j j aw r θ σ = −  
       Return, now, to the full-employment condition (1).  Output changes are obtained 
by differentiating (2) (yielding  ˆ ˆ jj ˆ K j x Ka = − ), and a substitution into the differentiated 
form of equation (1) (with λLj denoting the fraction of labor used in industry j), yields:  
(8)             11 1 22 2 1 1 2 2 ˆˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ () ( ) [ LL K LL K L L aa aa L K K λλ λ λ −+ −= − + ] .
] }
) .
Substituting in the definition of the elasticity of substitution from (3): 
(9)             11 1 22 2 11 2 2 ˆˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ () () { [ LL L L wr wr L K K λσ λσ λ λ −+ −= −− +
     The competitive profit equations of change, (6), can be re-arranged: 
(10)      ˆˆ ˆˆ () ( Kjj wr wp j θ −=−  
This relationship between changes in wage/rent ratio and wage/price ratios is useful in 
considering how the elasticity of demand for labor in the jth sector, denoted by γLj and 
defined as (minus) the relative change in the labor/capital ratio with respect to a relative 
change in the wage/price ratio, is related to the elasticity of substitution in that sector.  
Thus combining equations (3) and (10):   
(11)         γLj = σj/θKj   
What equation (11) reveals is that even if elasticities of substitution are constant, the 
elasticities of demand for labor and the factor-intensity ranking will in general not be 
  6constant if factor prices change, with the value of the σ’s indicating in which direction 
distributive shares move.   
       Throughout the paper we let the second commodity serve as numeraire, so that 
substituting back into equation (9) generates the final solution for the effect of a price 
change and endowment changes on the wage rate: 
(12)             11




=+ . V wp   







≡ ;   γL ≡ λL1γL1 + λL2γL2;     and VK 11 22 ˆˆ ˆ () LL K λλ ˆ L   ≡ +−   . 
Thus the effect of an increase in the price of the first commodity on the nominal wage 
rate is a fraction, β1, of the commodity price change.  γL represents the average elasticity 
of demand for labor in the economy and V the change in the aggregate capital/labor ratio.    
Clearly, β
ˆ
1 + β2 = 1. 
        It is especially useful to rewrite the fraction, β1,  in a form that reveals the role of 
factor intensities and factor demand elasticities, on the one hand, and the output share of 
the first commodity, on the other.   As is easy to show, β1 can be expressed as the product 
of three parameters.
7  
(13)         β1 = [i1 s1] θ1     
Taking these in reverse order:   
        (i) θ1 is the share in national income represented by output in the first sector. 
        (ii) s1 denotes the relative elasticity of demand for labor in the first industry, which 
is γL1/γL.  If there are only two sectors in the economy, this expression exceeds unity only 
                                                           
7 See Jones (1989) or Richard Caves, Jeffrey Frankel and Jones (2002), p. S-21. 
  7if the elasticity of demand for labor in the first sector exceeds a comparable expression 
for the second.   A rough way of referring to a situation in which s1 exceeds unity is to 
say that sector 1 has the more flexible technology. 
       (iii) i1 denotes the relative labor intensity in the first industry, indicated by the 
expression λL1/θ1.   An intensity definition for labor involves a comparison of labor’s 
distributive shares in the two sectors.  It is easy to show that the term λL1/θ1 is the same 
as the expression θL1/θL, a comparison of labor’s distributive share in the first sector to 
the average for the economy, θL.
8 Such an expression in the 2-sector case exceeds unity 
only if labor’s share in sector 1 is larger than in sector 2. 
       Equation (13) makes clear that relative labor intensities always work in tandem 
with relative elasticities of demand for labor.  We thus refer to (i1s1) as the intensity- 
elasticity nugget.  Given the interest that traditional trade theory accords the factor-
intensity ranking, we shall on occasion assume that such a ranking dominates in 
determining whether or not the size of the nugget exceeds unity.   
 
2.  Real Wages and the Beta Function 
       The real wage rate received by labor will be improved by an increase in the price 
of the first commodity if and only if the relative increase in the nominal wage rate, 
captured by the fraction, β1, exceeds the increase in labor’s cost of living, indicated by 
the share that the consumption of commodity 1 takes in labor’s income.  Call this share 
δ1.  Thus the real wage increases if and only if as p1 rises β1 exceeds δ1 or, if p1 falls, β1 
falls short of δ1 so that the cost of living falls more than the nominal wage rate.  
  8       Without further restrictions on the taste pattern of laborers we are left with what 
has been termed the neoclassical ambiguity, the fact that changes in the terms of trade do 
not necessarily improve or lower the real wage rate.  To help simplify matters, we now 
make an important assumption:  Workers share the same homothetic taste pattern as 
possessed by all other agents in the economy.  Later we sometimes assume an even more 
strict taste pattern for labor. 
       Given that an increase in the relative price of the first commodity improves the 
real wage rate if and only if (β1 - δ1) is positive, it proves useful to decompose this term:     
(14)          (β1-δ1)   ≡   (θ1-δ1)  +  (β1-θ1) 
The first term on the right-hand side represents the terms-of-trade effect.  A positive 
value, revealing an excess of production of commodity 1 over consumption, implies that 
the country exports the first commodity and therefore benefits by an increase in its price.   
The terms-of-trade effect always operates to improve the real return to labor, given our 
assumption about labor’s taste pattern.  The second term has special significance for 
workers because it compares the increase in the nominal wage rate with the importance of 
the first commodity in overall production; (β1 - θ1) is what we call the production bias 
effect, and it can be rewritten as (i1s1–1)θ1.      
       Ruffin and Jones (1977) argued that there was a presumption that the real wage of 
workers would be improved by a rise in the price of exportables, so that mobile labor 
would be supportive of free trade.  Their presumption was based on the fact that if 
exports were “typical” or “neutral” in terms both of labor-intensity and the elasticity of 
demand for labor by sector (that is both i1 and s1 were unity, or at least the nugget was), 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 Let Y denote the value of output.  Then λL1/θ1 = (X1aL1Y)/(X1Lp1) = (waL1Y)/(wLp1) = θL1/θL. 
  9the bias term would disappear so that β1 becomes θ1 and the real wage would increase by 
moving to free trade.  However, if the country does export the first commodity, but the 
nugget, (i1s1), is sufficiently smaller than unity, the bias effect might outweigh the 
favorable terms-of-trade effect, and increases in the relative price of exportables would in 
that case hurt labor.   
       For the moment let us make one further assumption about demand in order to 
focus on the production side of the question.  This assumption is that labor and indeed all 
agents consuming in the economy possess Cobb-Douglas utility functions so that the 
consumption share for the first commodity, δ1, is a constant. As we proceed, we indicate 
how conclusions would need to be modified for more general homothetic tastes.  
       Turn, now, to the upper diagram in Figure 1.  Recall that throughout we are 
holding constant the absolute price of the second commodity.  The Cobb-Douglas 
assumption underlies the horizontal δ1 line.  The production share θ1 curve must rise 
monotonically with p1.  The intersection of these two loci, where local demand and 
production are in balance (point A), establishes the price of the first commodity in 
autarky, p1
A.  It is the β1 curve whose shape may be much less regular.  For illustrative 
purposes the Beta function in Figure 1 rises for low prices and then turns down to 
intersect the θ1 curve at point B and the δ1 line at point E (and earlier at point C).    
       The lower diagram in Figure 1 explicitly shows the dependence of the real wage 
rate on relative commodity prices.  As drawn, the β1-curve lies above the θ1-curve at the 
autarky price.  By (13) this means that for prices near autarky the value of the intensity-
elasticity nugget, (i1s1), exceeds unity, so that some exports of the first commodity 
unambiguously favor labor, while labor would lose if the country imports relatively small 
  10amounts of commodity one.  Suppose world p1 is greater than the autarky price.  At point 
B the bias term vanishes, and then works against labor for higher values of p1.   Between 
points B and E the terms-of-trade effect, (θ1-δ1), outweighs the negative bias term, (β1-θ1) 
or (i1s1-1)θ1, so that the real wage still rises with increases in the export price.   
       We have assumed that the free-trade price is at p1
T.  Labor clearly gains by free 
trade.  Does this mean that labor would necessarily vote against protection?  No, because 
a reduction in price to p1
E would achieve a local maximum for the real wage rate.   
       Now consider the opposite trade pattern (p1
T lower than p1
A) so that the country 
would import good 1.  In the neighborhood of the autarky price the bias term indicates 
that labor would prefer the country to export the first commodity.  Therefore price 
reductions down to p1
C would lower the real wage; the bias effect outweighs the 
favorable terms-of-trade effect so that the reduction in the nominal wage rate is more 
severe than the drop in the cost of living.  At even lower prices, however, the fall in p1 
leads to a terms-of-trade improvement (the country imports the first good) that becomes 
sufficiently powerful to outweigh the adverse effect of a positive value for (i1s1-1)θ1 
when p1 falls.  Point C represents a minimum for the real wage.  
       Two aspects of the β1 (Beta) function in Figure 1 should be emphasized – its 
height, and its shape.  First of all, labor’s interests are generally biased towards having 
the country export the first commodity because at autarky the crucial product, i1s1, 
exceeds unity.  A basic asymmetry between the two sectors of the economy in autarky has 
been assumed, an asymmetry reflecting either sector 1 being labor intensive or having a 
more flexible technology, or a combination of the two.  Secondly, as drawn, the extent of 
this bias changes with price increases.  For prices higher than at B, the product, i1s1, 
  11becomes smaller than one.  If the relative substitution term were “neutral”, the labor-
intensity ranking would reverse at this point, with commodity 1 becoming capital 
intensive for higher values of p1.
9  To focus on this second feature, in Figure 2 we assume 
an absence of bias in autarky, implying that the β1 curve passes through the autarky 
intersection of the θ1 and δ1 curves.  The value of the nugget, i1s1, unity at autarky, 
increases systematically with increases in p1 in the β1
’ curve, decreases systematically 
(but not too severely) in the β1
” curve, and decreases so sharply in the β1
”’ curve that the 
curve actually becomes negatively sloped.  In more detail:    
   (i) The β1’ curve: Labor unambiguously gains from trade regardless of the pattern of 
trade.  What is the role of labor intensity?  It is only one part of the i1s1 term that is 
monotonically increasing with p1 (passing through unity at the autarky price).  But 
suppose we (arbitrarily) invoke what can be called the “strong labor-intensity” 
assumption, viz., that the size of the product (i1s1) exceeds unity if and only if the relative 
labor-intensity term for the first sector, i1, is itself greater than unity.  This stacks the 
deck, as it were, in making the role of factor-intensity dominant.  Consider the result 
along the β1
’ curve: The country always exports its labor-intensive commodity, and labor 
always experiences an increase in its real wage from trade.  This case indeed provides a 
strong connection between real wages and labor intensity, even stronger than in Stolper-
Samuelson because here the country always exports its labor-intensive commodity.    
     (ii) The β1
” curve:  The strong labor-intensity assumption now implies that the first 
commodity is capital intensive for p1 above the autarky price and labor intensive for 
prices below autarky.  If we maintain our assumption that tastes are Cobb-Douglas, then 
                                                           
9 Note that the relative labor intensity ranking could thus get reversed with price changes for an economy 
  12once again labor gains in real terms if the country exports the first commodity.  What 
happens if the first commodity is imported, instead?  Labor still gains in real terms since 
the nominal wage would fall by less than labor’s cost of living.  However, note that 
regardless of the trade pattern the country always imports its labor-intensive commodity.  
The result: The strong link between labor gains and labor intensity of exports is 
completely disrupted.  And by assumption the blame cannot be laid at the feet of 
asymmetric substitution terms.  As well, this case supports the neo-classical ambiguity 
about labor gains if we remove the assumption of Cobb-Douglas tastes and assume, 
instead, that demand curves for commodities are inelastic.  The δ1 curve would become 
upward sloping, and might lie above the β1 curve for some prices.  Case (i) does not face 
this problem if we assume that there is a unique equilibrium point in autarky.
10  
     (iii) The β1
”’ curve:  Here the decline in the size of the nugget, i1s1, as p1 increases 
is so severe that the Beta function is negatively sloped.  If tastes are Cobb-Douglas, labor 
must lose by trade, regardless of the trade pattern.  Suppose the strong labor-intensity 
assumption is once again invoked.  Then, as in case (ii), the country always imports its 
labor-intensive commodity, so that in Stolper-Samuelson fashion protection would 
always be applauded by labor if imports are labor intensive (and in this case they always 
are).  If consumer tastes lead to elastic commodity demands, however, the δ1 curve also 
becomes negatively sloped, again opening up the neo-classical ambiguity so that labor 
might actually gain by trade.  
As we now show, these cases are distinguished by the size of the elasticities of 
substitution in production in the two sectors.  The β1’ curve is associated with elasticities 
                                                                                                                                                                             
with given endowments.  This phenomenon is ruled out in the Heckscher-Ohlin model.   
  13of substitution greater than unity, the β1” curve with elasticities smaller than unity but 
greater than some value that is less than ½, while the negatively sloped β1”’ curve is 
associated with substitution elasticities even smaller. 
  
3.  The Case of Constant Elasticities of Substitution in Production 
       The structure of the specific-factors model suggests that the adoption of the 
popular constant-elasticity-of substitution production function specification (CES) can 
aid in the analysis both of the slope of the Beta function and how changes in factor 
endowments cause the function to shift.    
  The benchmark case is the one in which the β1-curve and the positively-sloped θ1-
curve coincide:  Production in each sector exhibits Cobb-Douglas technology with 
identical distributive shares for labor, with factor shares remaining constant with any 
change in relative commodity prices.  The bias term always vanishes and the real wage 
always increases away from autarky.  Furthermore, the strong symmetry between sectors 
suggests that neither an expansion of the labor force nor a balanced growth of sector-
specific capitals would shift the Beta function because outputs would both expand at the 
same rate.  Of course an expansion in one specific factor alone would, at constant 
commodity prices, raise β1 if and only if the first sector is the favored one. 
A change in commodity price ratios has an effect on factor price ratios that is 
uniquely different to that found in the Heckscher-Ohlin model – wages rise relative to 
rents in one sector, but fall in the other.  The effect this has on distributive factor shares 
and thus on the value of the intensity-elasticity nugget depends sensitively on whether the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
10 That is, with uniqueness of equilibrium the δ1 curve intersects the θ1 curve only once. 
  14elasticity of substitution in each sector exceeds or falls short of unity.  In our joint query 
as to the slope of the Beta function and the manner in which this function shifts with 
endowment changes we turn, now, to the general range of possibilities. 
First, suppose both σ1 and σ2 are larger than one.  An increase in p1 (with p2 
always constant) must lower the relative wage but raise labor’s share in sector 1 and raise 
the relative wage but lower labor’s share in the second sector.  Thus unambiguously i1 
would increase.  But so would the substitution term, s1, in the CES case.  The link 
between the elasticity of substitution and the elasticity of a sector’s demand for labor is 
shown in equation (11), so that if the σ’s are constant, a drop in θK1 and an increase in 
θK2 must serve to raise the relative elasticity of demand for labor in the first sector, s1.   
(Incidentally, the values of the elasticities of substitution need not be the same between 
sectors).  The consequence: The part of the bias effect indicated by (i1s1-1) must be 
increasing as the price of the first commodity goes up.  (In Figure 2 this occurs with the 
β1’curve, rising above and away from the θ1 curve.)   High σi’s imply that a rising export 
price serves increasingly to improve net benefits for labor.   
       A quite different scenario for the elasticity of the Beta function emerges when 
both elasticities of substitution are smaller than unity.  An increase in sector 1’s price, 
once again lowering the wage/rental ratio in sector 1, now causes θL1 to decline.  By 
equation (11), a constant σ1 now gets translated into a smaller value for the elasticity of 
demand for labor.
11  With opposite changes taking place in sector two, both s1 and i1 fall.  
                                                           
11 Strictly speaking it is not necessary to assume CES functions.  A glance at equation (11) reveals that as 
long as the elasticity of substitution does not change as much and in the same direction as the capital share, 
the same qualitative results will hold. 
  15        If the elasticity of substitution in one sector exceeds unity and in the other falls 
short of it, the relative values that are captured by both i1 and s1 might not change much 
so that any gap between the β1 and θ1 curves would remain relatively unaltered. 
       If both elasticities of substitution are less than unity, could the increasing bias 
against labor in the (i1s1-1) term outweigh the positive terms of trade effect as the country 
exports the first commodity at ever better price?  Yes, the β1 curve could be negatively 
sloped, and a further bit of algebra helps to divulge the necessary conditions.
12  As well, 
we show the effects of endowment changes in altering the value of β1.  Differentiating the 
expression for β1 in equation (12) leads to:                    
(15)           121 2 1 2 ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ {( ) ( )} LL LL ββλλ γ γ =− + −
       The first term in brackets is clearly positive if p1 rises, since labor will be transferred 
to the first industry.  Using our earlier algebra, the explicit solution for this first term is: 
(16)          { } 12 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 ˆˆ ˆˆˆ ˆ ( ) ( LL L L 2 ) () p ss V KK λλ β γ β γ −= + + − + −  
The dependence of the second term on relative demand elasticities is easily explicable.  
Suppose the labor endowment rises at given commodity prices (thus lowering V).  This 
lowers the wage rate and new labor is channeled to both sectors, but especially to the 
sector with the more flexible technology.  If, instead, both capital supplies were to be 
increased in the same proportion, the wage rate would rise in both sectors, and labor 
would be drawn away from the more flexible sector.  The role of the third term is 
obvious; a greater relative increase in the type of capital specific to the first sector would 
directly help to reallocate labor towards the first sector. 
                                                           
12 This possibility emerges clearly in extreme cases not requiring extensive analysis (Ruffin and Jones, 
2002). 
  16         With CES functions assumed (not necessarily the same elasticity in the two 
sectors), the second term in brackets in (15) is given by   which leads to:  21 ˆˆ ( KK θθ − ) ,
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Here the important role of the σ’s versus unity in determining the direction in which 
distributive shares change is confirmed.  Compare the role of these elasticities in the two 
coefficients.  With a price change, the wage/rental ratio falls in one sector and rises in the 
other.   Therefore if both elasticities exceed unity (or both fall short of unity), capital’s 
distributive shares move in opposite directions in the two sectors, thus enhancing the 
difference in their changes.  By contrast, suppose the labor endowment rises (a lowering 
of V).  At constant prices this lowers the wage rate in both sectors, thus changing capital 
shares in the same direction if both σ’s are either greater or less than unity.     
       Combining (16) and (17) into (15) yields the result we need to examine the effect of 
price or endowment changes on the price elasticity of wages, β1:  
(18)      
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The form of the coefficients is striking both in the similarities and differences between 
price and endowment changes already noted in equation (17) and in the crucial 
  17comparison of each elasticity of substitution with a fraction that could never exceed ½. 
13   
Thus for changes in commodity prices, a sufficient condition for the β1 schedule to be 
positively sloped is that elasticities of substitution in production exceed one-half. 
14              
In the coefficient of the V term, we notice (as in (17)) that since the wage/rental rate 
moves in the same direction in the two sectors, the shift in the Beta function, whether up 
or down, might be small if both σ’s are greater than, or less than, unity.  
ˆ
 
4.  Possible Adverse Effects of Trade on Workers 
       We started this paper by asking when international trade hurts workers.  Now we 
have the necessary ingredients for the answer.  Let the world price of the first commodity 
on world markets be higher than in autarky, with expectations that such a relative price 
will rise even more in the future, further encouraging greater globalization in the form of 
expanded exports of the first commodity.  Because labor must gain by the terms-of-trade 
effect, it can be hurt by trade only if the bias effect, (i1s1-1)θ1, is sufficiently negative.
15  
A (damaging) small value for the intensity-elasticity nugget suggests some combination 
of relative labor intensity in the import-competing sector and relatively inflexible 
technology in the export sector.  Furthermore, equation (18) reveals that if technological 
flexibility throughout the economy is severely limited (very small values for both σ1 and 
σ2), any further stimulus to exports given by rising prices can make matters even worse 
                                                           
13 In the Melvin and Waschik (2001) paper, an example is provided where each sector’s σ has the same 
value of 0.4 and the same labor shares in autarky.  This example is like Figure 2’s β”’ curve, downward 
sloping and passing through the consumption share δ1 line at the autarky price.  
14 A question about the effects of technical progress on real wages that leads to somewhat similar 
conclusions was raised in Jones (1996).  
  18for labor.  Although the economy would gain by an improvement in the terms of trade, 
labor would be left out – real wages would fall.  Such low elasticities convert an 
improvement in the terms of trade into significant reductions in the value of the nugget, 
dragging the value of the price elasticity of wages, β1, even lower. 
       Could an expansion of the economy’s capital stock improve the prospects of such 
expanded trade for labor?  The good news for labor is that at given terms of trade any 
increase in the stock of capital must serve to raise the wage rate.  But what effect would it 
have on the position of the Beta function?  Would this be shifted upwards, thus enhancing 
the effect of any further export price rise on the nominal wage rate?  Clearly the 
composition of the increased capital stock makes a difference (see especially equation 
(16)); the more this favors the first sector the more apt is the β1 curve to shift upwards 
(especially because of the positive effect on the share in production of the exportable 
sector, θ1).  Neglecting this effect (by having a balanced expansion of capital in both 
sectors), the answer depends on the sign of the coefficient of V in equation (18), and two 
special cases in which the bias terms works against labor can be considered.   
ˆ
        Suppose, first, that although labor intensities are the same between sectors, s1 is 
smaller than unity (because σ1 < σ2).   As the wage rate rises with the balanced increase 
in capital stocks, labor moves towards export sector 1, thus raising all three multiplicative 
components of β1.  Labor is thus favored for any further improvements in p1. 
         By contrast, if the size of the nugget is small because it is the import-competing 
sector that is labor intensive ( θL2  > θL1) while each sector exhibits the same value for its 
                                                                                                                                                                             
15 If i1s1 is smaller than unity, the bias effect becomes increasingly negative the larger is θ1.  However, 
equation (14) reveals that the first (terms-of-trade) part of the expression {(θ1-δ1) + (i1s1-1)θ1} increases 
more with a rise in θ1 than would any negative bias effect (as long as i1s1 is positive). 
  19elasticity of substitution (σi  = σ), the absolute size of this elasticity once again proves 
crucial.  The criterion for the β1-curve to shift upwards with a proportional increase in 
capital stocks becomes: 
(19)          (θl2 - θL1) (σ - ½)  >  0. 
The increase in capital stocks increases the wage/rental ratio (at given p1) by more in the 
labor-intensive import-competing sector 2.
16   If common σ is smaller than unity, capital 
shares fall in both sectors, but even more in sector 2 (as equation (17) confirms).  Thus 
the values of both i1 and s1 fall even more from their initial values; criterion (19) reveals 
that if substitution elasticities are even lower than ½, this reduction in i1s1 would drag the 
value of the β1 elasticity down even though θ1 is increasing.
17   
        The potential setting in which international trade could harm labor’s real wage is 
thus found in situations in which the export sector is not intensive in its use of labor 
and/or exhibits a relatively low flexibility in its technology.  As well, sufficiently low 
values for the elasticities of substitution could conspire to lower the price elasticity of 
wages, β1, as terms of trade improve.  A balanced increase in capital stocks would 
admittedly help labor by increasing the real wage rate for given commodity prices, but 
low elasticities would not help since they could cause the Beta curve to shift downwards.  
       On a more positive note, rents to the specific factor in the export sector are increased 
by trade. A signal is sent out to increase the supply of the specific factor, if possible, or to 
encourage technological change that will raise labor’s productivity in the export sector.   
The so-called “green revolution” in agriculture provides an example in which a fixed 
                                                           
16 With prices constant the wage rise, common to both sectors, must drive capital rentals down by more the 
higher is labor’s distributive share. 
  20supply of land can nonetheless yield expanding outputs without requiring sharp drops in 
labor’s marginal productivity.  And the large volumes of trade in raw materials, which 
may serve as specific inputs in export sectors, also serve as responses to the signal of 
higher local rents.  Although expanded trade may lead to concentrations in production 
and short-run gains to non-labor inputs that are temporarily rigid in their availability, 
such increases in rents signal supply changes over time that will work to benefit labor. 
 
5.   Two-Country Trade 
Trade theorists may have noticed something odd about our preceding explanation 
of how trade or protection affects real wages, viz. nothing was said about the causes of 
international trade.  The trading position depended only upon whether the exogenously-
given world relative price of commodity 1 was higher or lower than the price ruling in 
autarky.  If higher, the country exported the first commodity.  In this section we analyze 
the case in which the only two trading economies share the same technology and 
endowments of specific factors.  World prices are endogenously determined.  If the 
endowment of labor abroad is smaller than it is at home, the home country can be 
considered to be the labor-abundant country.  We also examine, albeit briefly, the case of 
trade caused by differences in technology.     
       What happens to the production ratio, x1/x2, when labor endowment L changes 
and commodity prices are kept constant?  We no longer need to assume a CES 
technology.  Because each output is constrained by the (given) endowment of the specific 
factor used in that sector (equation (2)), the change in the ratio of outputs, is shown by: 
                                                                                                                                                                             
17 Before any labor-reallocation a balanced expansion of capital stocks causes output to expand by 
relatively more in the export sector because it is capital intensive.  Additionally, the increase in the wage 
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With earlier expressions for these terms, and noting that from (12), 
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Thus if the foreign country has a smaller labor force, the ratio of its production of the first 
commodity to that of the second will fall if, and only if, the bias term favors labor for 
increases in p1.  If it does, i.e. if β1 exceeds θ1, abroad the autarky relative price of the 
first commodity will be higher than it is at home, and the resulting equilibrium world 
price, p1
T, will also exceed the home autarky price.  If, instead, β1 is smaller than θ1, the 
autarky price of the first commodity abroad would be lower than that at home and with 
trade the home country would import the first commodity. 
       These ideas are illustrated in Figure 3.  The β1 curve drawn there is downward 
sloping in order to represent the Melvin-Waschik finding that very low elasticities of 
substitution in production could spell trouble for real wages with trade.  Home and 
foreign countries share the same technology and the same endowments of specific 
factors.  Now consider autarky prices in the two countries with two alternative demand 
constellations (both Cobb-Douglas) represented by the δ1
(1) line and the δ1
(2) lines, 
common to both countries.  If tastes support the upper δ1
(1) line, the home autarky price is 
shown by H
(1).  With β1 smaller than θ1, the foreign country, with a smaller labor 
endowment, will have an autarky price, F
(1), lower than at home.  The free trade price lies 
between the two autarky prices, the home country imports the first commodity, and as a 
consequence its nominal wage rate is reduced by less than its cost of living so that real 
                                                                                                                                                                             
rate causes labor to reallocate towards the export sector since s1 is less than unity.  That is, θ1 increases. 
  22wages increase with trade.  If tastes are shown by the δ1
(2) line, the autarky home price is 
H
(2).   Because β1 exceeds θ1, as the foreign country loses labor, the relative supply of the 
first commodity abroad is reduced and the foreign autarky price is higher than at home.  
The home country now becomes an exporter of the first commodity and, with β1 
exceeding θ1, the nominal wage rate increase exceeds the rise in labor’s cost of living.  
Once again home real wages would rise.  And these favorable outcomes for home real 
wages can be seen to hold as well if the β1 curve is positively sloped.   
        The conclusion of this reasoning is that in the two-country case with countries 
differing only in their labor endowments, the labor-abundant home country’s real wage 
rate must rise with free international trade.  This is a strong result, because the labor-
abundant home country might export its capital-intensive commodity (it was only 
specified that the nugget exceeded or fell short of unity, not that i1 necessarily did).  Thus 
the labor-intensity comparison no longer provides the key either to income distribution or 
to the pattern of trade.  Furthermore, it does not depend upon the size of elasticities of 
substitution.  The basic notion that trade benefits the abundant factor is more general 
than suggested by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and is impervious to the Melvin and 
Waschik critique. 
       If trade is caused by differences in technology, such as is typical between 
advanced and developing countries, the array of possibilities shown earlier when the 
world price ratio was exogenously given now also apply.  And these results indicate that 
labor may indeed suffer with expansions of trade if substitution elasticities in production 
are relatively small in the export sector.  For example, now both countries could in 
autarky be at a neutral position (i1s1 = 1) but at different autarky prices.  Opening trade 
  23would thus hurt labor in both countries if β1 is downward-sloping and help labor in both if 
upward-sloping, just as in Figure 2’s β1”’ and β1’ curves, respectively.
18      
 
6.    Concluding Remarks 
The question of the effect of trade-related changes in commodity prices on the 
distribution of income, especially as regards the rewards to labor, has received prime 
attention both from trade theorists and from labor economists (e.g. Sue Collins, 1998).  In 
this paper we shift attention away from the classic Stolper-Samuelson finding that a 
factor-intensity ranking tells all about trade and real wages and, instead, concentrate on 
investigating more thoroughly what the specific-factors model tells us about the 
possibilities of gains or losses to labor, considered to be mobile between sectors of the 
economy.  A Beta function was defined, where the positive fraction, β1, shows the 
relative increase in the nominal wage should the first commodity’s relative price be 
increased.  For any given terms of trade the height of the Beta function depends on the 
asymmetry between sectors of labor demand elasticities and labor intensities. However, 
these characteristics respond endogenously to changes in relative prices, in a manner that 
depends crucially on the size of elasticities of substitution in production.  The 
presumption that labor gains by trade rests upon a positive terms-of-trade effect, just as 
for the economy as a whole.  However, there is a production bias effect as well, working 
against labor either when the elasticity of substitution or labor intensity are relatively 
small in the export sector, or when elasticities in both sectors are absolutely small.   
                                                           
18 Ruffin and Jones (2002) analyze technology differences in the simplified case in which production 
functions exhibit zero or infinite substitution elasticities, reaching the same conclusions. 
  24What has been said empirically about elasticities of substitution?   In a careful 
study Alan Woodland (1975) argues for low elasticities in Canada.  In Kenneth Arrow, 
et. al. (1961), elasticities were relatively high.  More recently, Edward Balistreri, et. al. 
(2002), examine the possibility of Cobb-Douglas values in 28 industries, and find support 
in 20 of them.  There is evidence of a broad range of estimates among industries, so that 
the asymmetries emphasized here may be very important.
19  A systematic survey of 
techniques, countries and results would appear to be useful.  
There is anecdotal evidence that trade might hurt labor in some developing 
countries.  From 1980 to 1999, Mexico’s exports as a percent of GDP increased from 
10% to 30%, but hourly wage as a fraction of per capita income fell by about 35%.
20  
Another example is provided by Thailand.  From 1857 to World War II, rice production 
and exports increased more than twenty-fold.  The terms of trade generally improved, but 
real wages fell while agricultural rents rose over the century (David Feeny, 1979).   A 
recent survey by Matthew Slaughter (2000) concluded, “…there is a range of inequality 
outcomes…..But in a large number of cases, trade and FDI (foreign direct investment) 
liberalization were followed by rises in income inequality…”  Empirical evidence 
consistent with the theory presented in this paper could well focus on the intensity-
elasticity nugget for export industries in developing countries. 
       Worker dissatisfaction with open markets can place political impediments in the 
transition to free trade.  Since free trade is generally beneficial and over long periods 
appears to generate sizeable gains from learning and scale effects (David Gould and 
                                                           
19 The ratio of highest to lowest elasticity was about 4 in Arrow, et. al. (1961), 6 in Tyler (1974), and 19 in 
Woodland (1975). 
20 Mexico’s per capita income in current U.S. dollars was $3,409 in 1980 and $5,060 in 1999.  But hourly 
wages fell from $2.21 to $2.12.   
  25Ruffin, 1995), economists interested in promoting free trade need to pay attention to the 
possible problems arising from factor specificity and to the policies that could be 
followed to overcome them. 
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